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ELECTION LAW AND ELECTION REFORM:
STRATEGY FOR THE LONG RUN
STEPHEN
I.

E. GOTTLIEB*

INTRODUCTION

The fundamental question posed by this article can be put in
the following way: Assuming that the purpose of election law is to
provide for responsible choice, including, at a minimum, reasonable consideration of alternatives, and for an accurate reflection of
the public decision, can that best be done by rules and regulations
which narrowly circumscribe the process, by example, or by encouraging personal involvement? What role can law properly play?
In the long run, this article will argue, a piecemeal approach
to election reform is prob'ably doomed to fail. Election reform has
seemed primarily a matter of financing, equal time, and voting
rules. Several pieces of legislation which lie well outside the provisions of the election laws themselves seem crucial to any long run
strategy for election reform: creating a system of national service
or similar system of real bridgebuilding among the diverse peoples
of our country; revamping the provisions of federal communications law to include a fair and mandatory system of debate among
candidates; and expanding direct media access by national and
grass root political organizations. Those changes in turn need to be
supported by other changes which cannot and should not be the
result of national legal requirement but which the bar can help
encourage: reorganization of school curricula to introduce specific
discussion of methods of thought; habituation in those methods of
thought, using ritualistic ways, such as debate, of including the
devil's advocate; and broadening the base of new-style, open, and
voluntary political organizations (which are sometimes referred to
as the club movement) to include services to the communities and
contact with community leaders.
This is written on the heels of a presidential campaign in
which one candidate went beyond most existing bases of power to
fashion victory. The process, however, must have raised questions
* Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law; B.A.,
1962, Princeton University; LL.B., 1965, Yale Law School. The author would like
to express his appreciation to Professor Harold Lasswell for his teaching and encouragement and to Professor Frederick F. Schauer for detailed criticism of the
manuscript.
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even in his mind about the implications for the future of present
election devices. And for many elections for lesser offices a great
deal of ground remains to be covered. It may seem early, but now
is the time to begin examining systematically and realistically the
difficulties, the alternatives, the complexities, and the possibilities
for election reform.
To the author, jimmying with the mechanics seems necessarily a shortsighted view of election reform. When, on the other hand,
the mechanics reinforce the spirit of democracy, lasting election
reform can be expected. This involves a concerted demand centering around well-understood mechanisms, like debate, open clubs,
or even identifiable factions-some more appropriate way of identifying candidates than by which ad agencies they have hired-for
responsibly presented choices. Election reform requires defining
what we are all for, rather than the easier task of defining what we
are against. Campaign financing only begins to raise these questions, coming as it does at the end of what still seems to be a jerrybuilt process.
II.

THE PERVASIVE ROLE OF LAW AND THE NEED FOR SYSTEM

Nominating and electoral systems are defined by law.' Law
defines who can vote, where, for whom, and when.' Law defines
what are a party,3 a candidate,4 and a political contribution.' Further, the law establishes how the parties and the money and the
voters get together.' The law has been used to solidify the power
of boss and reformer alike.'
I See generally Developments in the Law, Elections, 88 HARVARD L. REV. 1111
(1975). See also treatises on individual state laws, e.g., GASSMAN, ELECnION LAWS
(1962), regarding New York law. For the West Virginia provisions see W. VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 3-1-1 to -11-6 (1971 Replacement Volume, Cum. Supp. 1976).
2 See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), regarding the Federal Voting
Rights Act Amendments of 1970; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-1-3 (Cum. Supp. 1976);
id. §§ 3-1-3a, -2-2 (1971 Replacement Volume).
See Jenness v. Fortson; 403 U.S. 431 (1971); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S.
23 (1968).
See McCarthy v. Briscoe, 97 S. Ct. 10 (1976); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 815
(1969); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-5-4 (Cum. Supp. 1976); id. § 3-5-7 (1971 Replacement
Volume).
18 U.S.C. § 591(e) (Supp. VI, 1976).
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1975).
See R. CARo, THE POWER BROKER (1974); W. ELLiorr, THE RISE OF GUARDIAN
DEMocRAcy (1974).
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Proposals for changes in the law regulating political power are
abundant.8 But the task of analysis is quite complex. Legal proposals for change in the political area are the focus of research in many
different disciplines of which law is only one.' More important, the
laws involved describe a system of enormous complexity. Laws
now control the power to base power on existing power (the Hatch

Act,'" election laws," civil service laws'"), on knowledge (freedom

of speech and press,1 3 equal time," fairness,' 5 public information,' 6

conflict of interest, 7 libel,' 8 and fraud 9 ), on wealth (spending

22
limits,"' bribery,2' competitive bidding ), and on force (extortion,2
blackmail,24 secret ballot,2 intimidation, 2 Bill of Rights guarantees). Though more indirectly, these laws also affect the significance of different kinds of skill for political activities and the political significance of various loyalties, beliefs about right and wrong,
and the -opportunity to gain honor or respect through political action.

Many proposals, however, deal explicitly with only a single

variable.2 7 This would be acceptable if, but only if, it were against
8 E.g., Pearson, Cable: The Thread by Which Television Competition Hangs,
27 RUTGERS L. REV. 800 (1974); Raymar, JudicialReview of Credentials Contests:
The Experience of the 1972 Democratic National Convention, 42 GEO. WASH. L.
RFv. 1 (1973); Note, ElectionAdministration in New York City: Pruningthe Political Thicket, 84 YALE L.J. 61 (1974).
1 For research in the areas of history, political science, and sociology see, e.g.,
THE GREAT DEBATES (Kraus ed. 1962); in the area of economics see, e.g., DAHL &
LINDBLOM, POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND WELFARE (1953); and in the area of mathemat-

ics see, e.g., T.C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY

OF

CONFuCr (1960).

105 U.S.C. §§ 1501-08 (1970; Supp. IV, 1974).
" 2 U.S.C. § 431 (Supp. IV, 1974); 18 U.S.C. §§ 591-617 (1970; Supp. IV, 1974).
22 5 U.S.C. 44 3301-85 (1970; Supp. IV, 1974).
"U.S. CONST. amend. I.
47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1970; Supp. V, 1975).
,5See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
2 U.S.C. § 434 (Supp. VI, 1976); 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970; Supp. IV, 1974).
' 18 U.S.C. §§ 201-24 (1970; Supp. IV, 1974).
11See Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
,1 42 U.S.C. § 1973j (1970).
2 U.S.C. § 441a (Supp. VI, 1976); see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1975).
21 18 U.S.C. §§ 201, 599, 600 (1970; Supp. IV, 1974).
22 41 U.S.C. §§ 5-54 (1970; Supp. V, 1975).
See 18 U.S.C. § 872 (1970).
21 See 18 U.S.C. § 873 (1970).
25 T.C. SCHELLING, supra note 9, at 19.
21 See 18 U.S.C. 44 594, 606 (1970); 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1970).
2 See, e.g., note 8 supra.
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the background of a commonly understood and accepted analytical
system, which would help us to identify and account for the impact or impotence of each proposal on other aspects of the electoral
system. However, such a system of analysis has not been common
to the discussion, and analysis of the proposals has suffered in
consequence.
Successful strategy must be systemic in its orientation. It
must focus on all of the variables and the interrelations. Legal
remedies are often only part of what may become a successful
strategy. The contribution of the legal remedy should, therefore,
be seen from the vantage of the choice of strategy for dealing with
these problems.

I.

THE AREAS TO EXAMINE

A preliminary word about the organization of this paper and
the framework of the analysis will aid in the presentation. One
useful method of developing and of evaluating strategy in a systematic way is to start with a checklist of major goals and resources
of action and to trace the impact of each proposal against each area
on the checklist. The checklist used here is drawn from the work
of Harold Lasswell. 5 The goals and resources have been enumerated supra: power, knowledge, wealth, physical safety and wellbeing, skill, affection (loyalty or commitment), beliefs or ethics,
and honor or deference. Each of these areas has its corollaries in
groups of institutions like the media, corporations, and organized
crime, which control it, although not uniquely. Using these goals
and resources as a checklist provides a systematic basis for analysis
of political reform proposals and requirements.
This list of goals and resources also suggests choices. In effect,
this checklist enumerates competing systems, like clubs, patronage, and personal wealth, each of which can be a source of power.
A reform proposal preferring certain sources of power may pose a
threat to groups which rely on other bases. That threat might not
materialize if those groups were abused or poorly served by the
system of political power on which the groups relied and by the
representatives it produced. Groups are not necessarily well or
23See H.D. LASSwELL & A. KAPL1, POWER AND SOCIETY ch. 4 (1950). For an
extensive description of the method of analysis developed by Professor Lassweli see
H.D. LASSwELL, A PRE-Vixw OF PoLIcY SCIENCES (1971).
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always have an opportunity
badly served by any method. Leaders
2
to divert the efforts of the group.
It is a presumption of free government that a political system
based on knowledge and information should be more likely to reflect the interests of any group than other kinds of systems on
behalf of that same group." The purity of the theory is, of course,
confounded by a somewhat middle-class technocratic bias since an
information system favors those groups. It would be a mistake to
conclude that an information-based organization in one area is in
any way qualified to represent the people now served, for example,
by a loyalty system in another. 3' Indeed, the very demand that
political decisions be based on open discussion and public choice
is a reflection of changes in the electorate and declining confidence
in institutional leadership in America. There may be no cure for
such skepticism, however, save more democracy or, more precisely,
finding, creating, or strengthening institutions in which people can
have more confidence. In any event, much effort at political reform
is intended ultimately to strengthen public information and discussion as sources of power and to weaken other sources of
strength. The implementation and usefulness of that strategy,
however, have frequently been frustrated by partial or incomplete
analysis of the political system to which it was applied. Because
the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, a systematic approach is essential. 2
This article tries to do four things: (1) demonstrate the value
of using a systematic basis of analysis and criticism, (2) put various proposals in clearer perspective, (3) explore the strategic
choices outlined at the start of this article among options such as
circumscribing the election process, encouraging a better example,
" See R. CARo, supra note 7, describing the abuse of people under a patronageloyalty-based system; R. MICHELS, PoLrrmcAL PARTIS (1915), describing the dominance of educated elites over socialist workers parties.
0 T.I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1974).
21 See J.Q. WILSON, THE AMATEUR DEMOCRAT (1962).
22

For information on systems analysis see G. BLACK, THE APPLICATION OF SYS-

TEMS ANALYSIS TO GoVERNMENT OPERATIONS (1968); COUGER & KNAPP, SYSTEM ANALY-

SiS TECHNIQUES (1974). In systems terms Lasswell's checklist catalogues both inputs
and outputs. It catalogues the inputs of motives and resources, to which should be
added perspectives and other input variables of Lasswell's system. Further, it catalogues outputs as competing systems of power, plus distribution of benefits and
perspectives. The nominating and electoral systems are, in turn, subsystems of the
system of democratic government. See H.D. LASsWFL, supra note 28.
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and encouraging personal involvements in the process, and
(4) explore the role of law in those areas.
The sections that-follow will focus on comparison of the major
strategies used or available for nominating and electoral reform.
The strategies will be grouped by the basis for political action
which they most directly approach. The grouping is inevitably
somewhat arbitrary, however, since all of the strategies have impacts on all of the basic systems of action.
IV.

REGULATING POWER OR WEALTH

It sometimes seems necessary to say that power does exist.
One major argument represented by books such as Scammon and
Wattenberg's The Real Majority3 is that the parties are quite responsive to the American voter. The voters got what they wanted
in each election of the 1960's.14 However the political machinery
worked, and it worked in a wide assortment of ways, it generally
yielded to the popular will. And that is a pretty good record.
The argument goes further. The admen, too, operate within a
limited framework. They can package potatoes, but they cannot
sell them for cheese. All they really do, it would seem, is to pick
up a candidate-Jimmy Carter, for example-who, on the basis
of his prior experience and strength, merits packaging and then
to help him put his best foot forward. It is the invisible hand, like
free market economics with the added plus that it is democratic.
However, the record also tells another story that looks far less
inevitable, far less self-adjusting. While the issues of morality,
race, crime, and violence were controlling American politics, other
issues, even major ones, were exerting relatively little control. If we
are to believe Scammon and Wattenberg, not only did the voters,
concentrating on those social issues, pick a bewildering array of
liberals and conservatives on economic issues, but even as major a
problem as Vietnam was not seen as ground for a political choice.
It was dissatisfaction on the social issues, say Scammon and Wattenberg, that sent votes flowing to Gene McCarthy and Robert
Kennedy, that brought down Lyndon Johnson and that later sent
votes to George Wallace and Richard Nixon." Concerned about
Vietnam, Americans could not deal with it politically-the doves,
3 R. SCAMMON

& B. WArFNBERo, Ti RAL MAJoarrY (1972).

u Id.
3 Id.
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they say, did not flock to McCarthy, and the Nixon-Humphrey
election offered no choice on Vietnam, or so it appeared."6 What
was true of Vietnam, of course, was even more true of a variety of
less notorious subjects. And the social issues which predominated
were issues on which few Presidents could have done anything, a
fact of which many voters even seemed to be aware.
If a social issue without definable alternatives could lead to a
choice of candidates and wild fluctuations across the rest of the
political spectrum, is there not power in the system of discourse,
the system of nominating, the system of selection, which reinforces
these unsatisfactory choices and blocks a better response?
A number of efforts have been designed to limit or prohibit the
exercise of undue power by politicians, corporations, or persons of
great wealth." Other reform attempts have been aimed at equity
among voters. Efforts to restructure the electorate alter or redistribute power among the leaders. A decade of reapportionment has
38 Id.

3 E.g., Note, supra note 8, suggesting a nonpartisan election commission without, however, analyzing whom that system would empower; Note, PrimaryChallenges in New York, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 318 (1973), analyzing election law primarily
in terms of judicial convenience.
While the plethora of proposals to limit power certainly suggests that power
itself is the source of the problem, some writers define democracy as the competition of powerful elites. J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALIsM, SOCIAISM AND DEMOcRAcY 269
(1950). A basic decision is whether to pursue limitations toward more effective
control of power or to structure the political system to take advantage of power.
Powerful political parties on the English model could foreclose some of the sectionalism and logrolling that characterize American parties. COMM. ON POLTICAL PARTIES o THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASS'N, TOWARD A MoRE REsPONSIBLE TwoPARTY SYSTE M (1950). The broad constituencies of senators, for example, often force
more cosmopolitan approaches in their campaigns. See V.O. KEY, AMERICAN STATE
POLiTIcS 217-65 (1956). To reverse the perspective, larger constituencies separate
the people and their needs from their government. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 55-58
(A. Hamilton or J. Madison). Powerful national parties would change the sphere
of influence and corruption and, therefore, the dynamics of power. See E. CosrKVAN, BEHIND CLOSED DooRs 237, 296-307 (1966). However, powerful national parties
might also enlarge the problem of distortions of power because, on all but a few
national issues, the party could be far out of control.
On the other hand, powerful parties or parties with sufficient funds in their
treasuries, as would result from public financing, could afford to hire and reward
talent, instead of loyalty and other forms of support. That change in emphasis
might have major consequences on the quality of judges and other public officials
serving at every level of government.
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brought some improvements." The elimination of racial barriers"
has been quite effective on a sectional basis. Legal improvements
have been made in limiting durational and other voting requirements. 1 These changes redistribute power. By changing the constituency and by giving power to or taking power away from urban,
rural, suburban, racial, ethnic, or religious groups, they incidentally alter the system on which power is based to the extent that
those different groups handle themselves politically in different
ways.
Efforts to limit power directly have not always been successful. Civil service reform and the welfare state have gone far toward
cutting off some sources of power but manifest diminishing returns, among other difficulties." Both have left considerable opportunities for evasion and the exercise of executive power.4" Indeed, as power has moved from party to agency, so has the locus
of corruption-it is now plain that one does not have to buy the
party in order to buy favors."
The effort to require proportional representation for presidential nominating conventions44 is designed to eliminate the power of
national leaders and to restore local strength. Studying the effects
of such changes on the participants at each level, from local to
national figures, yields some surprising conclusions. The record is
still being compiled, but there is good reason to expect the development of a vacuum to be filled. One early hypothesis suggested that
the elimination of winner-take-all primaries would create an opportunity for minor candidates to step in the breach." By splintering representation in this way, proportional representation could
create enormous opportunities for logrolling and brokering at the
8 See W. ELuoTr, supra note 7; Gottlieb, Identifying Gerrymanders, 15 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 540 (1971).
3142 U.S.C. § 1973 (Supp. V, 1975).
"0

Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).

11Compare W. IORDON, PLUNKIrr OF TAMmmY HALL (1963), with Note,
Official Coercion of PatronageEmployees to Campaignfor Party Endorsed Candidates Violates Other Candidates' Right to Equal Chance and Voters' Right to
Equally Effective Voice, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1547 (1971).
412
R. CARo, supra note 7; E. CoSTIKYAN, supra note 37, at ch. 26.
43

E. CoSTIKYAN, supra note 37.

Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975); O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1
(1972); Note, Apportionment of Delegates to National Political Conventions, 85
HARv. L. REv. 1460 (1972).
45Kraft, The Cast, THE N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Nov. 17, 1974, at 32.
"
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national level, which had been minimal in recent years. It did not
happen that way. Instead, power seemed to flow to new kinds of
fundraisers, rock groups, pollsters, and media specialists. Power
shifted to a new group but, within that group, remained as decentralized and unpredictable as it had among the older breed when
large campaign contributions were allowed.46
For many, that decentralization, the pushing aside of encrusted forms of political power, is the very definition of election
reform. Decentralization surely gives the people some voice, but
under neither a centralized nor a decentralized system is it clear
that they are given much ground for decision or responsibly selected alternatives. The 1976 campaign seemed to combine a true
appeal to the people (who made a President out of an underdog)
with a great popular malaise, which combination suggests that the
problem of democratizing power is not as simple as eliminating the
latest bastion.
Still more opportunities for filling the power vacuum abound.
If 30-odd presidential primaries continue to snowball toward a
single candidate, the parties or major blocs of the parties might
find themselves organizing preprimary caucuses to unite themselves against all challengers-like the so-called challenge primary
concept.47 In that form a single preselected liberal standard bearer
might oppose a predetermined moderate for the Democratic nomination, with a similar Republican conservative-moderate contest.
Since the primaries channel choices only at the culmination of a
long process, many arrangements are possible.
It remains to be seen whether, over the long run, the 1976
conventions herald the power or impotence of media, money,
bosses, or imagemakers. In effect, some other forms of political
power may gain over money without improving the responsiveness
of the process. (On the concurrent shift toward an "open" process
see section VI infra.)
Efforts to limit the role of money in politics48 also redistribute
power. Giving and spending limits which preceded the most recent
11Id. For a discussion on the significance of logrolling see T.C. SCHELLING,
supra note 9, at 32-33.
, See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-372 to -453s (1958, Supp. 1977).
' Nicholson, Campaign Financingand Equal Protection,26 STAN. L. REv. 815
(1974); White, New Approach to FinancingJudicialCampaigns, 59 A.B.A.J. 1429
(1973), highlighting the lawyer/judge problem.
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49
amendments had not been very effective. Preliminary reports
suggest that the latest version had a greater effect." The litigation
over the funding and spending laws suggests their significance in
reallocating power. 5' However, public financing hands to recipients
powerful fiscal leverage.5 2 Since money has been a prime weapon
against bosses, these reforms, to the extent they succeed, suggest,
not real reform, but a shift of power from money to new kinds of
manipulators. These reforms also shift power to prosecutors and
investigators. In the wide-open and unorganized sphere of the primaries, the advertising industry seems so far to have been most
significant, limited, of course, by the attractiveness of the candidates they take on but making and affecting choices just the same.
Whatever the degree of influence they may or may not exert,
whether power will remain in the advertising industry and whether
advertisers will prove more or less responsible and useful kingmakers than bosses, newspaper chains, or banks remain to be seen. It
is not, of course, possible to make the possession of power go away.
The only possible quest is to mold it into a form which is useful
and responsible.

The elimination of legal barriers like filing fees has been but
a minor sideshow; though aimed at making it possible for people
without means to enter the political arena, it has hardly made
campaigning a poor man's pastime.53
Another major effort at reform has focused on the media.
Some concern regarding the media has involved competition
largely between the-major parties: debates, equal time, fairness.,U
Whatever these options may do to improve competition among the
giants, they do not directly democratize internal party power,
though, as will be argued below, they can generate significant effects indirectly. On the other hand, efforts to open channels of
expression to the masses usually involve suggestions for splintering
the media-via cable or an increase of channels. The intended
Sterling, Control of CampaignSpending, 59 A.B.A.J. 1148 (1973).
E.g., Auletta, Baby-Sitting for Jimmy in New York, N.Y. MAGAZINE, Oct. 4,

1976, at 11, 13; N.Y. Times, May 28, 1976, § A, at 12.
" See Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (per curiam), modified,

424 U.S. 1 (1975).
12 Plattner, Campaign Financing-The Dilemmas of Reform, THE PU.
INmTEST, fall 1974, at 112.

51Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
5 See Jaffe, The EditorialResponsibility of the Broadcaster-Reflectionson
Fairnessand Access, 85 HARV. L. Rv. 769 (1972).
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objective is to reduce at least the networks' power. To the extent
that it does, the proper inquiry is to whom or to what the power
flows. If multiplying television channels reduces the impact of television, we would need to examine what other institutions would
gain. If multiplying channels splinters the audience, we would
have to consider whether a class of voters would be more insulated
from competing viewpoints than at present. It seems less likely
that viewers would expose themselves to more diversity than they
do now. To suggest that some viewers would be less exposed to
divergent viewpoints is to suggest that they are more reliant on
preexisting loyalties and preconceptions, that bases of power other
than knowledge ultimately control more of their electoral behavior.
Some have suggested common carrier status, in which the stations
would merely sell time and give up the power to choose programming, but that suggests a vacuum to be filled, as in the early days
of broadcasting, largely by existing wealthy institutions.55
These legal weapons are restricted in their effects. Some redistribute power with minimal effects on the system. Others alter the
relationship of power and money without altering the fundamental
irresponsibility of power itself in either form. The reason for these
limited effects may become clearer with a brief catalogue of the
power relationships required to run a political machine, whether
in the style of the old ward heeler or the more modern broker and
fundraiser or in more newly emerging styles.
It is necessary to examine both what people can give the
bosses (managers, brokers, the people in control by whatever title)
and what bosses can give the people." (Despite the fluid situation
in presidential politics, bosses and machines continue to dominate
a large part of the remaining election process.) Political power is
itself derivative. Bosses need the elements of control over elections,
whether primary or direct. Those elements include work (canvassing, poll watching, electioneering, fundraising, envelope stuffing,
etc.) and money (at best for advertising and other campaign costs,
at worst for bribes or favors) or, sometimes-and it has not died
0 Compare BARNouw, THE GOLDEN WEB 14-15, 34 (1968), with POWLEDGE, AN
ACLU GUIDE TO CABLE TELEVISION (1972); Oppenheim, Television for the Poor, 8
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 698 (1975); Pearson, supra note 8; Note, ConstitutionalRemedy for the High Cost of Broadcasting and Newspaper Advertising in Political
Campaigns, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 1371 (1972). For information on public access channels see 37 Fed. Reg. 3289, § 76.251(a)(4) (1972).
11Cf. E. COSTIKYAN, BEHIND CLOSED Dooas (1966).
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out-physical threats (meetings can be and quite often have been
7
ruled by violence and intimidation) and information. Bosses can
get these in several ways. They can use money to get other forms
58
of control through bribes, graft, appointments, or payments.
They can use preexisting power or anticipated power over those
elected or among those seeking favors or their power to hire people,
to control the flow of jobs, or to affect the manner of law enforcement. They can depend on and utilize ethnic or family or racial
loyalties. They can use physical power to obtain many of these
elements of control through underworld connections." Thus, most
boss power has been based on money, preexisting power, loyalty,
and fear of physical harm. Occasionally bosses have used control
over the media; that is, they have used knowledge as a basis of
power."' Although information has meant power since the days of
Sam Adams," it seems even more manipulable in the days of television. One result of this very brief catalogue is to demonstrate
that changing any one of these variables changes, but does not
eliminate, the distortions of political power. It merely changes
what the powerful do to maintain power and who is in power,
without fundamentally altering the fact of control.
Thus, to return, proportional representation and the new campaign financing laws appear to have shifted discretion away from
large financiers and national politicians to some new breeds of
power brokers. Restructuring the electorate and controlling spending or the media, at least in the forms proposed, are all effective
in shifting power around, but none of them cuts off the bases of
power over the people (probably an impossible task) or, more importantly, promises to build a more responsible and reliable foundation with which to amass that inevitable power. This analysis
of attempts to controls power and wealth largely by legal sanction
is not to suggest that some measures (the Hatch Act, the secret
ballot) have not made a difference or that other measures might
not, but it is to suggest the difficulty, the costs as in the case of
the Hatch Act, and the dependence of such measures on other
resources left after the changes.
supra note 56.
E.g., R. CARO, supra note 7, at 209.
5' W. Moscow, THE LAST OF THE BIG TIME BOSSES (1971).
10N. CUNNINGHAM, THE JEFFERSONIAN REPUBLICANS (1957); J. MILLER, SAM
ADAMS (1969); S. Gottlieb, Political Thought in Concord, Massachusetts, 1830-40
(unpublished thesis, Princeton Unviersity 1962).
It J. MILLER, supra note 60.
57 E. COSTIKYAN,
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There are two alternative means of controlling power: a plethora of prohibitions by law, such as we have discussed, or development of other and perhaps more legitimate sources of power. (This
choice resembles the distinction Davis draws between confining
and structuring administrative power in DiscretionaryJustice.)6"
We turn to some of these now.
V.

BUILDING ON THE PEOPLE'S AFFECTIONS AND BELIEFS (THEM
DEDICATIONS)

If attempts to regulate the impact of power and wealth on the
electoral system are not wholly satisfactory, is dedication the answer to the problem of making democracy more capable and more
responsible? And if dedication is the answer, can it be engineered?
It seems difficult to account for developments such as the growth
of political clubs, the changes in party rules, and most of all the
break in the dyke of Jim Crow at every level from politics to literature unless one refers to generic changes in attitudes and dedication to principles of free government."3 In just such changes of
attitude the law has significant long-term effects.
A.

Dedication to the System

The first attempt to have law play a positive long-term role
in the development of free electoral institutions derives from a
utilitarian view that people would support a democracy if it responded to and satisfied their desires (on all goals and resources
from wealth to honor),." As far back as the 1780's this view suggested strengthening or centralizing power"5 to increase the effectiveness of government. Attachments are not automatic. 6 The
legal system often seems quite unresponsive." And losers have
been plentiful. Nevertheless, the Constitution has been enormously successful. The valuable conservatism resulting from dedication to the system, however, does not resolve problems of needed
change.
82

K.C.

DAvis, DIscaRIoNARY JUSTICE 97 (1969).

'3 C. WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (1957).

"'THE FEDERALIST No. 17,

at 80 (M. Beloff ed. 1948) (A. Hamilton); 1 A. DE

ToCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY INAMERICA chs. 17, 25 (P. Bradley ed. 1957); 2 id. bk. 2,

ch. 8, bk. 3, ch. 21.
11 THE FEDERALIST Nos. 9, 11-13, 15-17 (A. Hamilton); id. No. 10 (J. Madison);
id. No. 18 (A. Hamilton & J. Madison).
p. DRUCKER, MANAGEMENT (1974).
C.E. SILBERMAN, CRISIS INTHE CLASSROOM 42-45 (1970).
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Dedication to the People

A more prevailing approach toward obtaining loyalty to free
electoral institutions and commitment to staff them is based on an
ideal of public service. This ideal is perpetuated in the Peace
Corps, VISTA, ACTION, and other programs, not to mention the
military and other government positions. An early expression, involvement of many citizens in the militia, sought, not only to make
self-defense possible"8 and to prevent military rule, but also to
secure loyalty to the system itself. (On Lasswell's list, affection
and physical safety are intertwined at every level-internal strife,
external defense, and the operation of the democratic machi69
nery.)
The hope has always been that a dedicated, concerned people
would supply the manpower needed to keep the polls and the politicians clean and democratic. Paradoxical though it may seem,
mass armies have often strengthened democratic institutions by
strengthening mutual respect for the diverse people of the nation.
They bring people together from widely separated parts of the
country to live and work, to share the same problems, and to learn
about different sections of the nation." Calling on the young for
public service can build many bridges on the shoulders of youthful
energy and enthusiasm.
However, such national service could also backfire. Integration creates both brothers and enemies. There is good reason to
believe that the benefits would be greater if it were compulsory and
therefore encompassed a true cross section of American society.7
There are additional dangers in sending inexperienced young people into difficult situations in which they might be exposed to this
country's most difficult problems. 2 The results might not be predictable-enthusiasm can turn into cynicism, impatience, or even
U.S. CONsT.

amend II.

, See note 28 supra.
70 For a history of the use of conscript armies in America see generally R. F.
WEIGLEY, A HISTORY OF THE U.S. ARMY (1967). For a description of the violent
conflict between citizen soldiers in the Bonus Army and regulars under Generals
MacArthur and Patten see the opening of W. MANCHESTER, THE GLORY AND THE

(1974). For an extensive examination of soldiers' attitudes see S. STOUFFER

DREAM

et al.,

STUDIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN WORM WAR If

(1949).

11For a provocative theoretical discussion see K. DEUTSCH,
SOCIAL COMMUNICATION

72 Riesman,
READER

NATIONALISM AND

97-126 (1962).

A Mixture of Motives, in U.S.
25-28 (1968).

PEACE CORPS, THE PEACE CORPS
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intolerance, possibly leading to less democratic and more authoritarian ideas for many. Violence can flow from cynicism. Thus, it
is important to know whether and when universal service would
increase or decrease the volume of cynicism.
Conscription, in Lasswell's terms, can create affection toward
a system or a people if and only if the underlying common beliefs
are sufficiently strong. 3 The resulting dedication, however, has
only a very generalized impact on most power relations and can
have more or less democratic results depending on the political
system. What conscription does is raise the stakes. The content is
elsewhere. Nevertheless, with that qualification, the single step,
taken within the past decade, with the greatest long term impact
on election machinery in the country, may well turn out to be the
end of conscription and the demise of a mass army.
C.

Dedication to Institutions-the Struggle

More focused than dedication to the system or to the people
are loyalties toward those institutions which monitor and alter the
democratic system. Constant vigilance is plainly the price of freedom. One major strategy for eliminating improper power over
nominating and electoral systems has involved the network of voluntary organizations which seek to preserve and protect free and
democratic institutions.74 Looking well beyond particular cases,
these groups stand as relatively permanent watchdogs. The cases
on which they work alter the rules but seldom the system. Nevertheless, the groups do alter the system by their very presence.
These watchdog groups tackle endless abuses of power which
directly and indirectly affect the political system: mass, political,
or warrantless arrests or searches, harassment, murder of demonstrators, refusal of permits, censorship, and electronic snooping.
On the political side, they tackle endless perquisites of power: tax
breaks, large political contributions and favors, clouds of secrecy
surrounding lax enforcement of all kinds of regulations, unequal
11H.D.

LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN, POWER AND Socury (1950).

71 E.g.,

the ACLU, the anti-Defamation League, Public Citizen, Common
Cause, League of Women Voters, and many other clubs, leagues, church groups,
federations, and local organizations that are active in these areas, together with a
variety of more political groups from all parts of the political spectrum, ranging
from the Conservative Party to the National Lawyers' Guild.
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districting, financial barriers to filing for office, and lack of representation for minorities, among other issues.75
The problem of these private organizations is keeping their
groups together to deal with the never-ending series of problems.
This requires dedication. Many organizations use the struggle itself to develop commitment. The process of organizing and cooperating around a common purpose creates its own solidarity." In
this form, the emotional ties are more closely related to the issues
and 78to knowledge of the issues than to traditional political loyalties. The process resembles Jefferson's insight that repeated revolution would be necessary to renew the sinews of democratic and
free government. 79 Issue-oriented organization is itself a more positive approach to the problems of democratic government than the
regulatory approach described in Part IV supra (though the one
may be the grist to the other's mill). This approach attempts to
build a base of power and to drive out less worthy systems.
To develop a strong organization, mere agreement has to be
built into commitment, and the ranks of each organization and its
public must be constantly renewed. To do this, each issue must be
used to intensify the commitment of the people to reform, because
no one issue resolves the problem."0 The political trial was clearly
aimed at this problem.8 Thus, procedural issues-disclosure, freedom of information, wide latitude for the press'do double duty.
They not only make a vigilant public more effective, they also help
make the problems public and, therefore, keep the public alert. 2
Consequently, the struggle itself becomes a strategy used to create
commitment. Freedom of information laws and the fight against
the secrecy and disclosure rules being considered as part of the
71 See reports, publications, and dockets of and literature about those organizations listed in note 74 supra.
76 S. ALINSKY, RULES FOR RADICALS (1972).
" See H.D. LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN, supra note 28, at 31.
78 For discussions on traditional systems see W. Moscow, supra note 59; K.P.
PHILLIPS, THE EMERGING REPUBLIcAN MAJomRTv (1970).
"' Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, Jan. 30, 1787, in 11 PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 92-96 (J. Boyd ed. 1955); letter from Thomas Jefferson to
William Stevens Smith, Nov. 13, 1787, in 12 id. 355-57.
" S. ALNSKY, supra note 76; see Lin, The McIntireMarch: A Study of Recruitment and Commitment, 38 PuB. OPINION Q. 562 (1974-75), observing that prior
commitment is the greatest single determinant of future activism, not merely ideological agreement.
" P. ZIMROTH, PERVERSIONS OF JUSTICE (1974).
1 R. MICHLS, supra note 29 (keeping the public alert is no mean feat).
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proposed recodification of the criminal laws (popularly known as
Senate 1) are, in this view, critical to the integrity of the election
process.
This strategy of relentless, organized struggle has become the
dominant American strategy. In this tradition, the struggle for
freedom, crucial to a democratic electoral system, is most readily
identifiable as a defensive court battle against injustice 3-no
doubt a measure both of success and of failure, as are Watergate
and the continued distortions of power.
The strategy of struggle can mold consensus into commitment
and alert the believers. Ordinarily, however, it is not a strategy
which can create a consensus about what is right. Quite the opposite, the strategy of struggle polarizes people. Indeed, the polarization is part of the method-it creates an enemy to be fought."
Although the continuing struggle for freedom and democratic government is essential, it is also incomplete, leaving out a significant
segment of the population. The Warren Court and its constituency
left out the Burger Court and its adherents. Indeed, Hoover's FBI
and its constituency supported wiretapping, political fraud, and
sabotage in flat violation of statuteO but with such increasing political support that the Justice Department even tried to use the
disclosures to increase its authority."8 Battles also can be a way of
spending, not winning, adherents. Although the battles for peace
in Asia, for impeachment, and, until recently, for civil rights on
behalf of blacks have been largely successful, the battle for civil
liberties and truly free and frank discussion have been increasingly
problematical.87 At this point, the relationship among dissent,
democracy, and election reform remains needlessly clouded, and
the dedication to operate and maintain a responsible electoral system remains very much in doubt.
u The strategy of freedom, interestingly, was at one time in large part a process
of cajolery and gentle consensus building. See R. HOFSTADTER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM
(1964).
11 S. ALINSKY, supra note 76.

IN THE AGE OF THE COLLEGE

15Donner, Electronic Surveillance: The National Security Game, 2 THE
RV. 15 (1975).
" N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1976, at 22.

CnL

LIBERTIES

"See, e.g., BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF SOCIETY OF AMERICA-N LAW TEACHERS, SUPREME COURT DENIAL OF CITIZEN ACCESS TO FEDERAL COURTS TO CHALLENGE UNCONSTITUTIONAL OR OTHER UNLAWFUL ACTIONS: THE RECORD OF THE BURGER COURT (1976).
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STRATEGY BUILT AROUND KNOWLEDGE, INFORMATION

Education, information, and communication have enormous
impacts on us. Can the flow of knowledge and perceptions, from
doctrine to example, be molded into the service of free
government? Can it make power more responsible? Can it make
power both worthy and accountable? Can it be made to improve
the system of elections?
A.

Legal Doctrine Regarding Speech, Press, Assembly

The expression of legal doctrine in rules, laws, and constitutions is an exercise of power. They also have another function.
Concepts such as fairness, equal time, and freedom of speech and
press, as well as secrecy, privilege, and the like, provide a definition of right and wrong. They are a public example of what freedom
and liberty mean. They are not necessarily good ones. For example, the doctrines of fairness and equal time, both, have failed to
produce a decent public model of discussion and, instead, have
encouraged growing bureaucratic complacency with censorship."
Good or bad, however, they are models.
The question relevant here is the feedback from legal doctrine,
the ways in which application of law may strengthen the consensus
on which democratic government rests. The protective aspects of
law are vital to the extent that they preserve physical well-being,
which is essential to further development of free government. 9 But
legal emphasis on protecting the opportunities for expression, assembly, association, and participation is scant nourishment for the
consensus supporting a democratic election process. The opportunity for expression has often seemed futile for ourselves and a nuisance when exercised by others. No election system can function
well on so cynical a base. As we shall see, however, a more positive
model can have both direct and indirect impact on the allocation
For a general discussion of fairness and equal time see B. SCHMIDT, JR.,
AccEss (1976). Compare id., with Baron, Access
to the Press, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1640 (1967). So far, the Supreme Court has supported
agency regulation (of television), Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367
(1969), but has opposed judicial regulation (of newspapers), Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). For a discussion of similar problems arising
in part out of the secrecy and news media privilege issues see Weaver, The New
Journalismand the Old ThoughtsAfter Watergate,THE PUB. INTEREST, spring 1974,
at 67.
11T.I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7, 13 (1971).
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS VS. PUBLIC
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of power among political organizations based on patronage,
money, information, or other resources.
B.
1.

Legislation

Media-the Use of Models

The colonists saw religion as the source of the spirit of the
people, of their morality, and, therefore, of their ability and will
to operate a good system of government.2 0 Historians have laid
greater stress on tradition." Political scientists have substituted
for tradition the slightly more sophisticated concept of congruence
between democratic traditions and other decisionmaking traditions in the same society. 2 All these formulas have in common
their reliance on the people's sense of righteousness, however
formed, and of honor-a sense that can, in part, be forged.
Though having far different purposes in mind, two groups of
professionals-educators and advertisers-have been concerned
with the process of forming the people's sense of righteousness and
honor. Educators came up with the not very surprising conclusion
that children copy their parents even more than they listen or
obey. 3 The advertising world proved long ago that learning by
copying is equally effective with adults. Further, the advertisers
developed a formula: put one of the right people or a superstar on
a screen with your product, and people buy it. Apparently, people
either perceive the image as right or are anxious to bask in the
same glory or both.
Their example suggests that a strategy of creating and reinforcing a model could reach and affect a very broad audience. We
strategists could use the information media to create a tradition
and invest it with honor and righteousness. The effect of such
devices and traditions, about how to arrive at decisions, on the
exercise of power, obviously, is quite indirect. Yet the evidence
suggests that these factors are quite powerful in democratizing
power. " Perhaps the very indirection of the approach, by neutralizing some potential opposition, is part of its strength.
90 B. FRANKLIN, AUTOBIOGRAPHY 115-17 (1955);

C. RossITER, SEEDTIME OF THE

REPUBLIC 120-21, 295 (1953).
(1953).
2 H. ECKSTEIN, TOWARD ATHEORY OF STABLE DEMOCRACY (Research Monograph
No. 10, Center of International Studies, Princeton University 1961).
E.g., T. GORDON, PARENT EFFECTIVENSs TRAINING 273-75 (1970).
g H.ECKSTEzN, supra note 92.
:I C. ROSSITER, SEEDTIME OF THE REPUBLIC
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2. A Model of Freedom
Freedom is now largely a set of negative commands: do not
infringe; let him talk if he must; etc. 5 However, because people
react far better to positive stimuli, a model could be useful.
One strategy for strengthening democratic institutions is to
build a model or tradition of free discussion-a public model of
discussion, one which includes listening to the other side." One
wonders, for example, what the results would be if television stations presented in succession all their soap commercials for the
week or if political candidates, regularly, had to debate.97 Would
people be better able to appreciate, evaluate, and incorporate
dissent? Would it have meaning beyond distant contests between
giant monoliths in presidential campaigns? There is, of course,
good reason to question the legitimacy of legal rules which prohibit
statements or advertisement's being presented in other contexts.
Censorship, after all, is the prohibition of statements, and, whatever distinctions might be drawn, it is unwise to approach the
problem in that way. On the other hand, the legal system, instead
of prohibiting, could provide opportunities for expression in a constructive and evenhanded way. This does not vault all legal problems, but at least one need not censor in order to improve discussion."
Models include both form and substance. Adversary discussion is the form or medium for some set of standards and methods,
perhaps, as indicated below, inculcated through the educational
system. Forms of adversary discussion, including debate as a common example, do not automatically create reasoned argument.
'

T. I. EMERSON, supra note 89, at 627.
For a variety of proposals with regard to opening discussion see J. SALOMA &

F. SONTAG, PARTES (1972).

U Scott, CandidateBroadcast Time, 56 GEO. L.J. 1037 (1968); Sterling, supra
note 49, at 1152.
" Both Miami Herald and Red Lion, supra note 88, dealt with access to the
media based on contingent events. The contingencies result, if access is required,
in discretion in some government oversight agency or court as well as possible
inhibition of the publisher or broadcaster. Neither case dealt with access based
on a formula. In this area the election finance and petititon requirement for ballot
access cases may prove more persuasive. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1975).
92S. KELLEY, POLMCAL CAMPAIGNING (1960); TH GREAT DEBATES, supra note
9. As anyone who has held a position of responsibility knows, some issues are so

charged and/or so complex that discussion is either prohibitive or not helpful,
regardless of the truth about the issues.
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Certainly experienced speakers can avoid issues. Their objects are,
not to persuade, but to agree. Time, more sophisticated audiences,
and the form itself may have their effects on the content. But,
more important, in McLuhan's phrase, the medium is also the
message.' And the message must include weighing or, better, analyzing conflicting arguments.
The soapbox, pamphlet, article, and book provided lively
models of discussion in earlier periods, when the relevant audiences were more closely knit.101 Sometimes diversity had to be
tolerated. 2 In a less closely knit world, it is easier to turn away
from, turn off, or put down an unwanted thought. It seems wise,
therefore, to add a tradition of listening to both sides-a tradition
of working with, not just tolerating, a loyal opposition. Debate,
hearings, and open discussion seem essential models now."' But
what of the allocation of power?
3.

Crowding out Other Forms of Power

Power can be channeled, but rule by a few cannot be eliminated by outlawing it.' That is the significance of the people's
determination, or lack of it, to be free and to share their freedom.
There is no known form of political organization, from town meeting to primary, that cannot be controlled.
Power is like a balloon. Press it in one place; it bulges in
another. It is possible to let the air out. Civil service, welfare, and
social security all changed fundamentally what power had to offer
to the poor, but only to the poor. Public financing springs from a
recognition that it is possible to alter fundamentally what the
wealthy have to offer to power. But public financing would give
power to those who receive the dollars or to those whose early
efforts draw the financing. Power changes; it does not disappear.
One of the most important facts about the several bases of
political action is that they can crowd each other out. This suggests
the possibility of building on improvements in communications-public discussion, education, and decisionmaking-to

110
M. McLuHAN

& Q. FIORE, THE MEDIUM IS THE
supra note 60.

0I N. CUMMINGHAM,

MESSAGE.

12 R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 83.
0' For discussion on the difficulties of and possibilities for a constitutional
model for debate see Scott, supra note 97.
W01
R. MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES (1916).
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crowd out other forms of power. If communications are good
enough, they can break down most forms of non-issue-oriented
power.
Thus, providing space and time might be more effective than
providing money in distributing power. Presidential debates-required, not optional-might influence the system by example. Together with campaign financing, the debates have already influenced the system. Power has flowed away from the traditional financiers both to new groups of fundraisers and to campaign technocrats, the pollsters and admen. What is disturbing
about this change is the continued importance of ad hoc organizations of experts, whose primary qualifications have been gathered
in selling other kinds of products, from songs to consumer goods.
Political campaigning still rests on some unaccountable or irresponsible bases. And it must supplement public appearances, including debates, with other vehicles for information about the candidates, information which cannot come out in the speech or debate format alone. Indeed, too much reliance on debate, which now
seems remote, would invite demagoguery. Nevertheless, the debate format places strong limits on the ballyhoo of marches, ticker
tape, and bunting. The opportunity to observe the candidates directly is unquestionably an advantage. Further, providing space
and time, as the League of Women Voters did, has the advantages
and disadvantages of more restricted use than providing money as
the campaign finance law does. 5
Extending the debate form further down by requiring other
candidates to debate would further decrease the opportunities for
manipulation. (There were other debates-some limited to newspaper press rooms, few televised.)' Providing places on the ballot
in primary elections and between-election media space or time for
elected clubs in each district (or for each area with, possibly, a
'0 Debate, space, and time laws face some constitutional hurdles but do appear possible. See CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
"I'For the texts of several debates in New York see N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1976,
at A 16, col. 1 (Buckley-Moynihan); id., Sept. 9, 1976, at 37 (senatorial candidates
for Democratic primary); id., Oct. 15, 1974, at 32, col. 1 (Wilson-Carey); id., Sept.
4, 1974, at 43, col. 1 (Carey-Samuels); id., Sept. 3, 1974, at 37, col. 1 (MorgenthauKuh). For report of a debate in West Virginia see The Dominion-Post, Oct. 25,
1976, at 4-A, cols. 1-4 (Rockefeller-Underwood). The League of Women Voters has
sponsored a variety of debates. N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1976, at 37. For comment on
debates in the 1970 Connecticut gubernatorial contest see H. KAHANE, LooIC AND
CONTEMPORARY RHErORIC 173 (1971).
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formula for proportional representation of views within the party)
could bring power much closer to the people than does the present
system of campaigning. Also worth consideration is giving the national parties the opportunity to make their own presentations
directly to the people, not as reply time, as the Democratic Party
requested some time ago in response to a speech by then President
Nixon,"0 7 but on a regular schedule (thereby avoiding all the discretionary problems of deciding when a reply is appropriate). When
newsmen refuse to print position statements on the ground that
such statements are, after all, press releases-and they do so refuse
-there appears a clear need to give parties and candidates some
direct access to the public without the real issues of second guessing newsroom judgment created by the fairness and equal time
provisions. As the networks do not now seem prepared to lay the
necessary foundations for our understanding of complex political
issues, perhaps the parties will be.'
These suggestions do not, of course, eliminate the opportunities to exercise and channel power. As should by now be clear,
power cannot be eliminated, and, regardless of our ideologies, there
is no practical way for the people to exercise power except through
powerful institutions. The best we can hope for, then, is to alter
the bases of power so that it is more rationally and responsibly
exercised. What are the shifts of power these proposals are likely
to create, and what will they mean?
First, power would be shifted to the various political consultants, advertising men, and pollsters. If space and time or, possibly,
even money were widely provided to political machinery, the major
role outsiders could perform for the organizations would be to help
them assess with greater reliability what the people want and to
think or write for the clubs. Even in this role, of course, these
professionals would have no monopoly. The club that canvasses its
members is likely to be stronger than the one that polls them. But
disparities will remain, and the use of consultants might well continue to be a major form of reintroducing collateral sources of
power. Even that use, confined within the outlet of public disputation, suggests a far more appropriate political and campaign pro,o' CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
'' The idea has at least been tried, although under somewhat different circum-

stances, in Britain. It might transplant. See Kilpatrick, Promoting the Ungreat
Debates, The Dominion-Post, Sept. 8, 1976, at 14-A, col. 3; Mitgang, Tuning in
the Public, N.Y. Times, April 20, 1976, at 35.
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cess, a process in which knowledge and information would to some
degree have pushed aside other forms of power. (Knowledge does
not insure good government-the people may be unjust, and the
system may still favor some groups of the people over others."'
Knowledge is only more appropriate than money, preexisting
power, and loyalty.)
A second arena for the reintroduction of power over the political process is concerned with who gets to use the time or space and
how that leads or contributes to who ultimately bears the parties'
standards in the general elections. There are two automatic checks
on this power: the need of each party to put forward its most
attractive spokesmen and the possibility that the press would be
stimulated by the challenge of direct political appeals to the public
to do a better job of explaining and covering issues. Beyond these
checks, it seems not unreasonable to suppose that local political
organizations would pool their time along such lines as the New
Democratic Coalition in the Democratic Party and similar movements in the Republican Party, resulting in a broader spectrum of
ideas. A formula for third party time is, of course, essential. In
these ways the levels of public discussion would probably be significantly enhanced. Party leaders would be more identifiable, and
the local political organizations could begin to reacquire legitimate
roles in the political process. Ultimately, only if continuing political institutions (local or national)," ' unencumbered by the corruption of traditional machines, can begin to challenge the power of
the personal political organizations that have dominated politics
for the last several years, can power begin to flow back to the
people in any rational, reliable, and organized way.
It is not, of course, easy to reestablish politics on the basis of
popular local organization by creating "reform clubs" which operate as modern town meetings within the party. Democratically run
clubs are very fragile flowers on the political landscape. Sam
Adams showed the techniques of intimidation to Boston before the
Revolution."' And Tammany Hall should be an ample reminder
of the opportunities for controlling a club." 2 Union violence may

"IR.DAHL,

A PRAcTIcE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1962); THE FEDERALIST No. 10

(J. Madison).
"'

1

See note 37 supra.
j. MILLER, supra note 60, at 66-71.

W. Moscow, supra note 59, at 16, 19-20. Meetings can be swamped, and

using the election machinery would make it more difficult for a boss to set up a
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be the best known contemporary example of such control techniques, but there are equally appalling political ones. Aside from
the so-called violent "fringe," the murder of reporter Don Bolles
suggests the depths of violence in Arizona. The killing of Yablonski
suggests more than union violence in the eastern mountains. The
rebirth of gang warfare is equally ominous in the cities. And a
scenic rivers bill was the focus of violence in the midwest. Beyond
all these, one suspects that violence is a more persistent part of
American politics than we have chosen to notice in present years.
Every attempt to democratization has invited powerful personal organizations which have left us deeply disturbed at the
continuing vagaries of democracy. Despite generations of reform,
the Long, Byrd, and Daley organizations, among many others,
persisted for decades. Tammany is gone, but Esposito took over
from Brooklyn. And other power brokers continually rise to control
the electoral process,' though often far more discretely than their
flamboyant predecessors. Attempts to open politics at the grassroots are susceptible to corruption of the spirit and ultimate cyncism and reconcentration of power, if not to outright violence and
intimidation. The protections gained with the secret ballot are now
challenged for the sake of democracy. It may be a costly exchange.
It is this fatal war between the need to rest a true democracy on
popular (and well-informed) involvement and the vulnerability of
open meetings that has doomed most efforts to strengthen our
political system beyond its current compromise and balances.
There are, of course, those whose solution to this conundrum
is a political elite-wiser and more well-informed than the rest of
us. The closest we can come to these benefits of elite representation, however, is in nurturing strong and responsible political parties, based on a well-informed public and opened to competition
from the leaders, rather than a loose system of personal organization based on image management. If this analysis is true, as it
seems to be, then the better solution is to place the needed knowledge and tools at the disposal of the people instead of providing
complex avenues for manipulation. Debate for major candidates
and space and time provisions for party organizations might well
strengthen and enlighten more direct democracy. It is well within
the possibilities of election law reform in these ways to replace
second club to choke off insurgents.
" See V.0. KEY, AMERICAN STATE POLITICS (1956).
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ballyhoo with discussion, privilege with leadership, and images
with debates.
Beyond these reforms, competition might provide some control over the vulnerability of open political organizations. Space
and time could be provided to two clubs per primary per district.
Money, so long as it is not a prerequisite to campaigning, could
provide useful competition. Wealth is the unpredictable wild card
of politics; it can unseat encrusted power and help keep clubs
honest. Competition might stem from candidates' meeting requirements for signatures on petitions."4 To assist competition further,
overlapping tickets might be prevented." 5 All of these factors
might provide real change in a democratic direction if the public
were sufficiently moved to operate the system well. Therein lies the
ultimate need for a well-integrated political system that matches
the cleverness of its formulas with the strength of its spirit. Like
the impact Adlai Stevenson had on political organization in
1952,116 that strengthening of the spirit may be the most lasting
contribution of a more elevated form of political discussion.
C.

The Role of Education-Developing Skill as Well as Belief

Although education is often thought of as a non-legal strategy,
in fact, the curriculum is often defined by law." 7 Conversely, education is basic to any strategy of reinforcing those aspects of our
legal and political system that define freedom, popular rule, due
process, and equal protection. And lawyers have successfully urged
many school administrators to include law-related subjects in the
curriculum.
One approach to education focuses on its relevance. Law is
now being taught in high schools and colleges along with other
courses that deal with today's concerns, such as drugs and racial
history."' Using this approach, history-including legal history,
the history of freedom, due process, and equal protection-can
teach our dependence on each other by bringing out the fact that
'"

McCarthy v. Briscoe, 97 S. Ct. 10 (1976); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431

(1971); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
"I

For the definition of party membership see A. BICKEL, THE NEw AGE OF

34-37 (1968).
,, J.Q. WILSoN, supra note 31, at 52.
,, See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18-2-9 (1977 Replacement Volume).

POLITICAL REFORM

"'
ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON YOUTH EDUCATION FOR CITIZENSHIP, LAW RELATED
EDUCATION IN AMERICA (1975).
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history has not been kind to many. It has enslaved and impoverished, not only blacks, but also white Christians, as well as Jews,
Muslims, miners, Indians, and Japanese, among others. ' 9 Indeed,
few are aware that this country rounded up Japanese Americans
into concentration camps for several years.' 2 Honest history would
reveal quite clearly how fragile the flower of free government really
is.
Nevertheless, relevance is not enough. Beyond such broad historical themes, the effort to be relevant, or timely, largely condemns the school to explore problems that will not be relevant to
the students when they leave school. Even more fundamentally,
schools are not teaching-cannot teach-what the demand for relevance presupposes. The only answers education can give are
methodological.' 2 ' The rest are hypotheses. However, schools, with
some narrow exceptions, do not teach method. Thus, they are most
relevant to specialists and to students willing to risk a variety of
preconceived notions, not to the everyday business of problem
solving.
There are other approaches to education. Education has, in
fact, been used for tradition building for some time, through, for
example, civics courses and discussion as a form of instruction. 22
Discussion does help to teach democracy. It can, however, help to
teach either the best aspects of democracy-effective, cooperative,
joint resolution of problems-or the worst aspects of democracy-a
mindless conformity.'2 The effectiveness of discussion depends, in

M'R.R. PALMER & J. COLTON, HISTORY OF THE MODERN WORLD (4th ed. 1970),
describing largely the troubles of the Christian peoples primarily in Europe. M.
MARGOLIS & A. MARX, A HISTORY OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE (1969), reflecting a long
history of genocide as well as reflecting common law which permitted the enslavement of Christians by Christians. R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976), describing the
problems of blacks in America. For comment on union struggles see Taft & Ross,
American Labor Violence, in VIOLENCE IN AMERICA (A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE) (H. Graham & T. Gurr
eds. 1969). On the exploitation of the eastern mountain population see H. CAUDILL,
NIGHT COMES TO THE CUMBERLANDS (1963). The list, of course, could be extended
indefinitely.
,20For cases regarding Japanese Americans in concentration camps see
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1945); Hirabayaski v. United States, 320
U.S. 81 (1943).
Mz,See generally H.D. LASSWELL, supra note 28. For more specific studies of
method see, e.g., D. BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, A STRATEGY OF DECISION (1963).
22 For an aptly
EDUCATION (1916).
22

titled book of much influence see J. DEWEY,

DEMOCRACY AND

The literature of management is replete with material on the best ways to
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part, on whether the participants have in mind a model of how to
resolve problems.
Teachers once taught methods of reasoning. Rhetoric now refers to florid argument. Although it was relegated to matters of
style in the colonial period, rhetoric was, along with logic and other
studies, part of an attempt to teach methods of thinking.' 4 At
present, method is taught as advanced collegiate electives: logic,
statistics, scientific method, polling, and other highly specialized
courses. Law schools teach a form of analytical reasoning.' 2 Business schools may teach systems analysis, and other graduate
schools may teach methods of inductive reasoning, all taught for
specialists. Thus, the first smattering of discipline-not just hard
work, but a logical, systematic approach to problem solving-generally comes, if at all, in graduate school, after 16 years
of schooling. Effective discussion, freedom, and democratic government could be strengthened by greater emphasis on method in
the educational system.
VII.

THE NEW CLUB MOVEMENT-INFORMATION AND DEDICATION IN

AN OPEN MEETING FORMAT

Although political parties are extensively regulated by state
laws, the internal organization of the factions competing for party
control remains largely unregulated. The problem of whether or
not those competing factions themselves have to be democratic
reached the courts in O'Brien v. Brown."I O'Brien involved the
right of the Democratic Party to enforce its own rule requiring that
each step in the nominating process be conducted democratically
or, at least, with open and wide public participation. For the Supreme Court, which had regulated elections in the apportionment
cases and primaries in the white primary cases, this was a third
generation challenge to find a key to democracy. The court declined.1
' 2 Despite the decision in O'Brien, can discussion of issues
encourage constructive discussion. For writings on conformity see D. REISMAN, THE
LONELY CROWD (1953); 1 A. DE TocQUEvILLE, supra note 64, ch. 16, at 263 (1957).
12 L. CREMIN, COLONIAL EDUCATION 102-04 (1970).
" The socratic method is very useful, for figuring out the common ground
among divergent positions; i.e., compromise. It is much less useful for solving
problems.
1- 409 U.S. 1 (1972).
227 Id. See also Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975); Raymar, supra note 8;

Note, JudicialIntervention in NationalPoliticalConvention: An Idea Whose Time
Has Come, 59 CORNELL L. Rzv. 107 (1973).
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and candidates, nevertheless, be made the cornerstone of the political system at the grassroots?
A.

Competing Values

Internally, the reform movement in politics represents another
form of information strategy. It tries to neutralize individual power
by keeping decisions open until after discussion at meetings open
to all members. The clubs also reflect a mode of focusing the loyalty and affection of people. Clubs focus loyalty and affection both
on a model and on the clubs themselves, which embody and depend on the acceptance of that model. In a word, the clubs involve
people as a town meeting might. They create a community within
what was merely a residential area.
Involving people could be pursued in other ways. The efforts
to reform registration laws and provide permanent registration
may bring more to the polls. The act of voting might create more
interest for some. But the vote must seem very hollow for many
people. The club movement creates deeper ties.
Within clubs, as well as within the larger political system,
however, knowledge, affection, and belief compete with other bases
of action-safety, power, money, honor. Left for another day in
O'Brien and Cousins v. Wigoda12 was the question of whether or
not the courts can define or enforce democracy among these complexities at the grassroots level of organization.
The issue, as it was and is being developed within the reform
organizations and as it was and, no doubt, will again be presented
to the courts, is quite different from the issue as it might be presented to a legislature. Legislatures announce rules for qualification and election, which can include rules for access to media,
funds, and other resources. The courts, however, are not free to
choose among systems. It is their job to measure compliance with
due process, equal protection, the guarantee of republican government, etc. Lacking that, they can demand a plan for compliance
(the primary route of the apportionment and segregation cases),
but there is scant authority for creating their own. Thus, the issues
are posed as lack of public notice or opportunity to be heard.
Those issues define what the Democratic Party rules called
openness-open meetings, open discussions, openly arrived at. Yet
1 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
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that openness, the strength and objective of modern political reform, is also its most vulnerable point. It is vulnerable because it
returns to political forms which themselves have been decimated
by direct modes of intimidation and bribery. The results depend,
after all, on who takes advantage of the open invitation and why.
Given these restrictions on the courts, the variety of expectations
and motives for political participation, and the vulnerability of
open meetings, the courts and, indeed, national institutions may
be able to influence democracy by example, but they cannot control it by rule.' 9
Clubs are subject to the same kinds of domination by organization as primaries and elections are-domination by default or
lack of interest or by fear or favor in money or other power. Motivated or favored workers can canvass the members before the
meetings and swamp or intimidate the members at the meeting.
If any faction in a club has special resources through loyalty, favors, or force, it may swamp meetings consistently. Indeed, if the
club is powerful, it may suffer its leaders to control its members.
Further, the club may have to consider appropriate membership
restrictions: attendance, duration, dues, work, etc. (On the other
hand, if the club remains powerless long, it may well atrophy.) The
larger the club, the more possible such domination becomes, e.g.,
Tammany Hall.
The battle is endless and ever more complex: elections, primaries, conventions, clubs, etc.-each was conceived as a response
to the last. Of all the responses, open clubs may show the most
variation, ranging from the most democratic to the most undemocratic of institutions.
Changes in political expectations, from Jacksonian commitment through Guilded Age laissez-faire and back to modem participation, and in attitude among different classes or groups of the
electorate appear to have been much more significant than
changes in form. With those changes, there have been changes in
the rewards and substance of political participation, varying
among favors, canvassing, petitioning, discussion, advising, checking, and sounding-from money and power to information and
morality-and back. National attitudes toward public service,
"I

The viability of the Teamsters after being expelled by the AFL-CIO some

years ago suggests the problem of enforcement. See also H.D. LASSWELL, supra note

28, at 63ff.
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public service agencies, and conscription affect these swings and
the viability of the club movement by influencing the objectives
which people are seeking.
These characteristics of clubs and other open meeting systems
at the grassroots impose limitations on the power of the courts or
of the party itself to declare and supervise a democratic system at
that level. It is clear that no one form or set of procedures works
across the political spectrum.
B. Participants
Nevertheless, if the national committees and parties are dedicated to maintaining popular democracy, they can redistribute
access to the party.'30 The attempt to strengthen the grassroots of
democracy by requiring democratic forms is as intriguing as it is
unusual. The willingness of the parties to require democratic forms
has in practice, however, often been compromised.' Their desire
to seek democracy as an objective has often been secondary to
political advantage. 3 ' Even when the will and desire existed, efforts to restructure local politics by national leaders have had limited success. 3 3 These problems raise the question of how much
power should be accorded to national institutions to achieve their
objectives, for such power may be used well or abused. In fact,
however, the new rules for the 1972 Democratic Convention had
made a substantial impact on the Democratic Party by the time
of the convention. 3 These revisions made important changes and
reflected basic changes in the party's active leadership. The allocation of power among different local and national segments of the
parties was one of the difficult questions the Court avoided in
O'Brien.3
The question of defining membership is similarly difficult.'3'

00

(1968); J. PARiss, THE CON(1972); Pressman & Sullivan, Convention Reform and Conventional Wisdom, 85 POL. Sci. Q. 539 (1974).
M W. Moscow, supra note 59, describing DeSapio as encouraging more democracy, up to a point.
32 W. ELLIOTT, supra note 7.
' R.CARo, supra note 7, describing city, state, and national efforts.
134Pressman & Sullivan, supra note 130.
A,

BICKEL, THE NEW AGE OF POLITICAL REFORM

VENTION PROBLEM

'M Of course, by not deciding substantive issues, the Court left intact the
prevailing relationships within the party.
lu A. BICKEL, supra note 130; Note, Bode v. National DemocraticParty, 85
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Externally, who can the clubs represent? From whom and on what
basis do they derive their power? Reform clubs, for example, recruit with posters, parties, meetings, and personal invitations.
They recruit for meetings, discussion, and political activism. Their
self-defined market is the upper-middle class that wants to meet.
The clubs represent the expression of a particular kind of skill,
style, interest, and confidence that is class-based.' 7 The history of
political parties is, of course, that they are run by small groups.'38
Perhaps that is the closest human equivalent to power to the people. Nevertheless, open political clubs could improve their power
and their ability to represent the community by reorienting their
thinking to marketing." 9 To do that, however, they would have to
know of whom their market could consist and what it would
want.'49 Further, they would have to be prepared to serve their
market. That would change the club.
The problem of definition is inherent in the political dispute
itself. For courts to regulate the membership of clubs would run
afoul of the right to associate freely to pursue political goals. Nevertheless, the degree of democratic power sharing is intimately
connected with the resolution of this definitional question. Moreover, the appropriate resolution is not a constant, because the
definition does, and must, change with the shifts in political dispute and the sharing of other values. Who is prepared to work
with whom? Who is prepared to share powers in discussions or
elections with whom? Thus, restriction can either preserve internal
democracy or prevent it. These variations reinforce the need for
flexibility in any applicable rules.
C. Are Nonlegal Approaches More Effective?
Political organizations often vault the definitional problem
with a consultation process. What do the people want? That question has been handled by caucuses, conventions, open meetings,
surveys, polls, and leader-to-leader consultation. The consultation
HARV. L. Rv. 1460 (1972). For a discussion of some of the differences and problems
involved in the conflict between the free speech and association approach and the
right-to-vote approach see Note, supra note 127, at 113-19.
'3 J.Q. WILSON, supra note 31, at ch. 9.
'' R. MIcHELS, supra note 29.
,P' p. DRUCKER, supra note 66, at 39-166.
'0 Reform and spoils are cyclical, in part precisely because of shortcomings in
the abilities of succeeding organizations to find out who wants what. S. MrrcHELL,
ELM STREET POLrrics 25-43 (1959).
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process is the procedural sine qua non of power.' In addition, it
is the basis for many new communications techniques.
Some of the applications of the consultation process have
names and some do not. Community organizers commonly bring
community leaders together to decide priorities, a procedure which
involves a large number of people through a personal network in a
high level of sharing of information. Businesses call what is much
the same process organizational development (also, OD and planning by objectives), incorporating many echelons of staff into
priority-setting conferences.' They also refer to polls-a less effective way of involving people, but a very good way to get information-as market research. Bosses do much of this consultation in
private, but, by operating privately, they concentrate the information flow in themselves.
The organizer, in any of these forms, uses knowledge as a
major basis of action. However, instead of appealing to people by
holding up an example, he reaches them more personally.' Out
of that participation he endeavors to have information shared to
such an extent that it drives out other forms of power. Community
organization is, in large part, a technique of using personal interaction, affection, and respect to broaden the base of political action.
Participation, to the extent it can be generated, creates a degree
of loyalty to the organization or system.'"
Political groups with reform objectives need to use an open
process. In that form, the clubs have available techniques for community involvement, if they can define their purposes more
clearly. Although, at this point, clubs exist primarily to serve the
political views of their members, they do also try to represent
communities. While keeping their memberships open, they must
find ways, such as these, of bridging the gap to those who do not
join.
Community involvement or sharing of power, however desirable, would by its very nature reopen the goals of the clubs. This
kind of organizational development might lead to a set of priorities
E. COSnKYA, supra note 37, at 289ff.
DRUCKER, supra note 66, at chs. 21, 34.
13 S. AUNsKY, supra note 76, at 98-104; see B. FRANKLiN, supranote 90, at 125'

2P.

26.
M 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILE, supranote 64, ch. 14, at 242. But see R. MiceLs, supra
note 29.
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making it possible for clubs to offer more services to the officeholders they support. Indeed, clubs might then have a mandate from
the community to take some chores off the shoulders of their representatives.
Clubs can offer, and some have offered, many things: advice
to tenants, administrative counseling, charitable programs, the
ability to arrange meetings with officeholders, experienced advocates, lectures, disclosures, social life, and recognition for members. Although most clubs start with political objectives only, constituents also have important nonpolitical objectives. Does purity
require neglect? If the club handles them fairly, are these nonpolitical needs inconsistent with political objectives, or do they actually
furnish support for the club goals? An ombudsman could offer few
of these things. He could hardly perform even the advocacy job
without power. The club, on the other hand, needs both the constituent pressure and the satisfaction from performance. The club
can provide some of the services with which representatives have
generally been plagued. In return, the club gains a better relationship with the community. It is thus strengthened, and a strong
club can protect its elected representatives from unwarranted pressures.
The difference between a democratic club and a boss may lie
less in what the club can do than in how it is governed. However,
as the clubs become stronger, the pressures against an internal
system based on ideology and dialogue and for a system based on
seniority or service or power become stronger. To resist such pressures, there may be no good answer save rebellion. Because all the
extra services provided by the clubs reintroduce all of the noninformational bases of power, the problem of eliminating these bases
from a system not systematically organized for their elimination
remains. Regardless of the possibility of reinforcing one system
above the others, the multifaceted needs of people remain.
Nevertheless, these strategies seem to be pieces of an essential
whole: a model of democracy, a forum for democratic involvement,
a commitment to service, and the intellectual tools for cool and
careful policy analysis. Moreover, if these approaches are effective,
legal rules defining membership and voting entitlements may be
inappropriate.
VIII.

CONCLUSIONS

While proposals for reform focus primarily on the sharing of
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power, the problem of reform is intertwined with the strengthening
of democratic institutions, values, and expectations. Most analyses of political reform are based on a static model. The questions
are definitional: is this democratic or fair or equal? A more difficult
task is to trace the outcomes, particularly the long run outcomes.
Strategies are largely concerned with the long run. Changes
which are imperceptible in the short run are irresistible in the long
run. This is particularly true of changes of will and sentiment
because democracy rests heavily on those two factors.
The long run of political reform and of freedom blend. Both
involve the sharing of power and strengthen the will and the occasions for sharing power. Political reform necessitates nourishing
the roots of freedom as well as pruning its branches.
Democracy requires at its core four interdependent and wellfunctioning systems: (1) a system of free discussion, (2) a system
of education, (3) a system of elections, and (4) a system of public
service-the institutions primarily shaping and sharing knowledge, skill, power, and affection. Major changes, however, have
affected each system. Freedom has been affected by the drastically
changed immigration patterns that followed changes in the immigration laws and by major social and political movements of this
century. Education has been revolutionized by public subsidy legislation and appropriations, specialization, method, and other
changes. Elections are increasingly complex. National service has
been voluntarized by ending the draft and by developing the ACTION programs. Thus, the foundations of democracy have been
changing, and they are not to be taken for granted.
Dealing with problems of this magnitude and complexity requires a systematic approach. The long run may need special
guardians. 4 ' One must account for each different base of power
and assess the changes in each area. Strategy must be formulated
with a map of the terrain.
,,5 H.D. LASSWELL, supra note 28, at 65.
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